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Resumen 
Aunque la ciencia y la religión pueden considerarse 
compatibles como dos métodos para buscar la ver-
dad, en la práctica divergen en sus efectos. Este 
hecho tiene serias implicaciones para la teoría y la 
práctica profesional de la información y la docu-
mentación. A partir del principio del derecho humano 
a la libertad de expresión —que contiene el derecho a 
la libertad de acceso a la información—, es posible 
comparar religión y ciencia y su tendencia al misterio 
o a la transparencia. El método científico es inheren-
temente escéptico, orientado a la comprobación de 
hipótesis mediante métodos y resultados expuestos 
abiertamente. Aunque la pureza de la ciencia resulta 
en ocasiones comprometida por sus financiadores —
gobiernos, corporaciones y fundaciones— y por los 
poderes científicos, ofrece un modelo de transparen-
cia. La religión se basa en la fe en alguna forma de 
revelación, frecuentemente encapsulada en un libro o 
libros, frente a la cual el conocimiento es contrastado. 
En la práctica esta preferencia por la autoridad y el 
misterio favorece el rechazo violento de ideas y 
promueve el secretismo tanto intelectual como or-
ganizacional. Se sugiere que las bibliotecas son insti-
tuciones que exponen ideas para su uso público y 
que, por tanto, son parte del proyecto científico. La 
censura y la supresión de ideas asociada con la re-
ligión debe ser resistida por los profesionales de la 
información y la documentación en cualquiera de las 
formas en que esta tendencia se manifieste, como, 
por ejemplo, en el resurgimiento del énfasis en la 
protección de la religión mediante leyes sobre la 
blasfemia. 
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Whilst science and religion are arguably compatible 
as two methods to identify truth, in practice they are 
divergent in their effects. This has serious implications 
for the theory and practice of library and information 
work. By starting with the human right of freedom of 
expression (which contains the right of freedom of 
access to information), it is possible to compare reli-
gion and science and their tendency towards mystery 
or transparency. The scientific method is inherently 
sceptical, testing hypotheses with openly exposed 
methods and results. Although the purity of science is 
sometimes reduced by its paymasters (governments, 
corporations and foundations) and by the scientific 
establishment itself, it offers a model of transparency. 
Religion is based on faith in some form of revelation, 
often encapsulated in a book or books, against which 
knowledge is tested. In practice this preference for 
authority and mystery encourages the forceful rejec-
tion of ideas and fosters secrecy both intellectual and 
organisational. It is suggested here that libraries are 
institutions that expose ideas for public use and that 
they are therefore part of the scientific project. The 
censorship and suppression of ideas associated with 
religion needs to be resisted by library and informa-
tion professionals in whatever form, such as a resur-
gent emphasis on protection of religion through blas-
phemy laws, that this tendency manifests itself. 
Keywords: Access to information. Freedom of ex-
pression. Scientific method. Transparency. Censor-
ship. Blasphemy. 
1.  Introduction 
‘Many women who dress inappropriately 
causeyouths to go astray, taint their chastity 
and incite extramarital sex in society, 
which increases earthquakes’ 
Ayatollah Kazem Sedighi 
 
 
Scientists who are religious and religious people 
who accept the importance of science tell us that 
they can reconcile the two in their own minds, 
some of them with little difficulty, but others only 
after much painful reflection. These believers 
seem able to take the essence of their faith and 
match its revelations with those obtained from 
structured observation and experimentation. 
When they have taken their thought to this level 
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of abstraction the polarities represented by scien-
tific method and religious belief seem to them 
quite illusory, merely representing two valid ap-
proaches to the essential truths of existence. In 
defence of this position, it is true, for example, 
that the first chapter of Genesis can be read as a 
poetic prefiguring of an evolutionary approach 
and that Muslims claim that the Koran has enco-
ded within it the whole of scientific knowledge. 
Whilst respecting the sincere and far from sim-
plistic view of the world that this approach can 
represent, for others of us the contradictions 
between science and religion loom large. Ayato-
llah Sedighi’s marvellously colourful equation of 
female sexual display with the incidence of 
earthquakes (which forms the epigraph for this 
article) shows just how ridiculous and dangerous 
this approach can be. What will be argued here 
is that for library and information science (LIS), in 
particular, the contrasting effects of religious 
belief and scientific thinking have significant 
theoretical and practical implications. 
To discuss this further we must begin with the 
human right of freedom of expression, which is 
arguably the very basis of LIS. This is the posi-
tion broadly promoted by IFLA’s Freedom of 
Access to Information and Freedom of Expres-
sion (FAIFE) of which the writer was chair 2003-
9. At this point it is necessary to explain the 
reference to ‘freedom of expression’, rather than 
the more obvious ‘freedom of access to informa-
tion’. The explanation is that Article Nineteen of 
the United Nations Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights (1947) is set out as a right to 
freedom of expression. To some extent this is 
unfortunate because it diverts attention from the 
underlying and, arguably, more fundamental 
rights of freedom of access to information and 
freedom of opinion. There is a line of argument 
that says freedom of expression is a human right 
because we can demonstrate that freedom of 
access to information is essential for the healthy 
development and functioning of the human brain 
(Sturges, 2009). By this reasoning the need for 
freedom of access to information is inherent to 
the human being and to deprive anyone of ac-
cess to information (however we may define 
‘information’) assaults their essential humanity. 
Therefore, whilst it might be possible to assert 
that there is no fundamental contradiction bet-
ween science and religion, if it can be shown 
that in practice the two are divergent in their 
implications for access to information, significant 
conclusions can be drawn for ordinary human 
beings. In the context of LIS, a divergence bet-
ween science and religion would mean that in-
formation and library services could differ accor-
ding to the degree of respect those providing the 
services paid to either science or religion. It will 
be argued here that this is a real danger in that 
concealment is natural to one: openness is the 
natural mode of the other. To be more precise, 
religion points towards mystery: science towards 
transparency. One chooses to regard the world 
and all that is in it as beyond human compre-
hension, a matter for a god or gods, with maybe 
a priesthood that can comprehend what is not 
intended for ordinary minds: the other strives to 
reveal and explain every detail down to the ti-
niest atomic particle. What follows will seek to 
expand on this and identify what it means in an 
information context. 
2.  Science 
Science’s claim to be true is not absolute, in 
contrast with the claims of religion. What science 
does is seek to provide the best explanation of 
phenomena available at the time. This is of 
course in the context of a search for absolute 
truth, but the characterisation of science as a 
rival religion, as opposed to a rival to religion, is 
not valid. Science works through the agency of 
scientific method: the rigorous testing and re-
testing of hypotheses and their identification as 
false if the evidence shows that to be the case. 
Science uses observation, measurement and 
experimentation to obtain evidence for theori-
sing. Both the evidence of science and the pro-
cesses of reasoning applied to the evidence are 
intended to be open to all who wish to know. 
The effectiveness of this process of scientific 
investigation and the conclusions that scientists 
reach are subject to peer review, in which pa-
nels of experts from the field assess research 
proposals, findings offered for publication, and 
the qualifications of individual scientists and 
scientific institutions. The scientific literature is 
open to all and provides the evidence that either 
supports a theory or allows the development of a 
hostile critique. 
In principle the method and the process sift out 
inadequate theories, bad research and uncon-
vincing reporting, leaving us with the best expla-
nation of any phenomenon or group of pheno-
mena that is available at any given time. Res-
ponsibility for any idea or set of ideas is spread 
across a wide spectrum of the scientific commu-
nity, from humble laboratory or field workers, 
teams of highly qualified and experienced thin-
kers and writers, juries of scientific peers, not 
forgetting the writers of popular science whose 
books and articles introduce and explain science 
to a wider public. Even when a theory has a 
scientist’s name attached to it (such as Eins-
tein’s special and general theories of relativity) 
no one actually owns scientific ideas, even 
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though the literature is rigorously searched to 
establish precedents, anticipations and contribu-
tory ideas. The ideas and the evidence for them 
are a public good. When functioning effectively 
this is a magnificent system, but there is a pro-
blem in that it doesn’t always function perfectly. 
For instance, the governments that finance 
science through universities, research institutes 
and laboratories, are not always neutral guaran-
tors of a sphere of freedom in which science can 
operate. Another key financial source, business 
corporations, want new science that helps their 
search for profit and protects their existing activi-
ties from interference on grounds such as public 
health and safety, or protection of the natural 
environment. There are other vested interests, 
the environmental movement for instance, which 
engage with science and dispute the validity of 
some of its findings. But more than this, science 
itself can be flawed in practice. The existence of 
a scientific establishment, including university 
professors and faculty members, presidents and 
committees of scientific societies, and members 
of official and corporate scientific advisory bo-
ards, is the source of the problem. The reputa-
tions, livelihoods, and indeed the belief systems, 
of members of the establishment are so closely 
associated with accepted findings and theories 
that they tend to suspect and, sometimes, mar-
ginalise science that challenges the orthodoxy. 
In these cases, the whole peer review system 
can look like a conspiracy to suppress challen-
ges, rather than a means of guaranteeing scien-
tific quality. The important thing to remember is 
that these are distortions and corruptions of an 
essentially strong and effective method to esta-
blish truths. For an example of the process in 
operation we can turn to the question of the 
origin of humanity’s close companion and hel-
per, the dog. 
Despite the amazing variety of dogs, the eviden-
ce is that all the breeds were developed by se-
lective breeding from wolves, on the part of 
humans who wanted to obtain a smaller, more 
easily tameable working animal. The generally 
accepted version of this has been that the pro-
cess began in East Asia approximately 10,000 
years ago. More recently, genetics researchers 
have collected sufficient dog and wolf DNA sam-
ples from different parts of the world to suggest 
an origin in the Middle East about 15,000 years 
ago. Dog remains found in dateable Middle Eas-
tern archaeological sites seem to support this. 
This suggests that the dog was either first do-
mesticated there rather than in East Asia, or that 
East Asian dogs might have been domesticated 
at the same time, but remained more like wolves 
because of subsequent cross breeding. Fairly 
naturally the scientists who had developed the 
original East Asian theory were uncomfortable 
with this potential replacement of their version. 
The interesting thing is that their defence of the 
East Asian theory is based on criticism of the 
data used for the Middle Eastern theory (sugges-
ting that it failed to include dog DNA from signifi-
cant regions in South China). The details of this 
are chiefly of interest to the scientific experts, but 
the debate depends on openly available data 
and fully published theorising based on this data. 
An accepted consensus may emerge, or one 
theory may defeat another, but in either case a 
transparent process is underway. Through this 
process the scientific method should eventually 
give us the best available understanding of an 
interesting and significant question. The purity of 
the process is less apparent with some more 
controversial topics such as climate change. 
Climate change and, more specifically, the idea 
that there is a process of global warming well 
advanced, features frequently in broadcast and 
published news. Images, such as those of polar 
bears trapped on ice floes drifting away from the 
safety of land, make this an issue that is not 
merely a concern of scientists, but something 
that disturbs the public mind. At its heart the 
issue is a matter of the enormous bodies of cu-
rrent and historical meteorological data availa-
ble, the computer systems that can be used to 
organise them, and the interpretations that 
emerge from informed examination of the data. 
There is, however, the personal observation of 
the ordinary person to take into account. It is not 
only that, for instance, in the UK meteorologists 
note that the 10 warmest years on record have 
occurred during the last 12 years. It is also ob-
servable fact that there has been little or no 
snow in lowland England during the lifetimes of 
the younger part of the population. And, of cour-
se, people from other countries have noted 
equally disturbing changes. 
Scientifically measurable patterns, personal 
observation and the suggestion that there is a 
broad, long-term trend in process fit together 
persuasively. Add to that the suggestion that this 
all is caused by damage to the ozone layer re-
sulting from the high levels of carbon emissions 
produced by modern industrial society and you 
have a potent mix of scientific concern and pu-
blic anxiety. For the non-scientific observer this 
is difficult issue to think through. In a lifetime one 
becomes aware of short term climatic fluctua-
tions, groups of colder and warmer years, dry 
seasons and wet ones. That such patterns 
stretch back further in time is obvious. In what 
we might call the medium term, anyone with 
some historical knowledge will be aware that 
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Britain was much, much colder during parts of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: fairs 
with oxen roasted on the frozen Thames are well 
recorded. These sharp variations in ‘normal’ 
weather patterns initially raise questions about 
the idea that there is a man-made pattern of 
global warming in process. At the very least, the 
issue of global warming is open to scientific and 
general debate. 
If one looks at the content of scientific communi-
cation on the issue, it is overwhelmingly in fa-
vour of the argument that global warming, driven 
by carbon emissions is in process. This is the 
authoritative view put forward by the [UK] Royal 
Society (2005) in a lengthy essay based on the 
findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC). It states that ‘This docu-
ment examines twelve misleading arguments 
put forward by the opponents of urgent action on 
climate change and highlights the scientific evi-
dence that exposes their flaws.’ Many, many 
similarly powerful statements from the scientific 
establishment could be cited. Governments 
have, albeit tentatively and usually ineffectively, 
signed up to international agreements to reduce 
emissions. Some major corporations have pled-
ged to reduce their ‘carbon footprint’. It is not 
actually very fashionable to go against this trend 
of opinion, yet a few scientists, journalists and 
many corporations, noticeably those with inte-
rests in the manufacturing and energy indus-
tries, do argue against the global warming ort-
hodoxy. Probably because the debate potentially 
affects the budgets of corporations and govern-
ments, it tends to become sharply polarised and 
hostile in tone. 
This very difficult area actually becomes a real 
problem when the principles of scientific trans-
parency are violated, as was the case recently 
at the University of East Anglia’s Climate Rese-
arch Unit (CRU). The CRU was exposed as 
having resisted attempts using the UK Freedom 
of Information Act to obtain disclosure of data 
sets held on behalf of the UN Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change. Leaked email sho-
wed a culture of possessiveness, contempt for 
critics and an unwillingness to cooperate with 
the law. Amongst other allegations, it was said 
that the head of the CRU, Professor Philip Jo-
nes, was trying to cover up bad data in a paper 
he wrote in 1990. In March 2010 a British par-
liamentary enquiry dismissed some of these 
accusations but criticised Jones for being ‘too 
possessive and secretive about the raw scienti-
fic data and computer codes they use to esta-
blish the link between global warming and 
human activities. They also criticised the Univer-
sity for fostering a culture of non-disclosure of 
scientific information from climate sceptics. 
(Connor, 2010). 
This unsavoury and harmful episode did, however, 
have the virtue of reasserting scientific transparen-
cy. This principle remains the origin of the scientific 
literature that is the greatest resource of the world’s 
libraries and the source of human material pro-
gress for centuries. 
3.  Religion 
What is the basis of religion’s claim to provide 
answers to broadly the same set of problems 
that are addressed by science? This varies from 
religion to religion, but most commonly it stems 
from some form of prior authority. The nature of 
this authority can be the word of a god or gods. 
This word is usually conveyed through the 
agency of a prophet or prophets, whose rende-
ring of the word is taken as accurate, authoritati-
ve and exempt from criticism. The revelation is 
generally set out in a book or books, which 
themselves may have become the object of a 
respect amounting to worship (The Holy Bible, 
or the Holy Koran). Subsidiary revelation can 
come from saints and miraculous events of one 
kind or another. Interpretation of the word is 
usually placed in the hands of some priestly and 
scholarly group who are granted (indirectly, by 
the original god) special insight into the texts of 
the word and any supporting revelations. Quite 
often their interpretations are openly or implicitly 
declared to be infallible and thus having some-
thing of the force of the original word. Believers 
often claim that their position of belief was rea-
ched by logical examination of the evidence for 
and against, but more commonly they themsel-
ves experience some sort of moment when the 
truth of the word becomes apparent to them, 
without the intervention of their intellectual po-
wers. At this point it is common for them to sub-
mit their will to the god, the prophets, leaders 
and priests, or whatever combination of these is 
the norm in their particular religion. Thereafter 
they are expected to study, meditate and im-
merse themselves in their particular faith to the 
exclusion of others. Of course, the believers in a 
particular faith will almost certainly claim that this 
is a travesty of their belief and church structures, 
but if we take religion as a phenomenon with 
many specific manifestations, the characterisa-
tion is not unfair. 
In the brief account of science that preceded this 
it was argued that, despite the imperfections that 
could be identified in the practice of science, it 
was essentially a very good method of discove-
ring the truth. The counter claim is that religion, 
despite its often beneficial role in society, is a 
very bad method of discovering the truth. Essen-
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tially it relies on the assertion that something is 
true because some authority says it is. The 
source of certainty may be some book compiled 
from oral tradition, translated from an imperfectly 
understood ancient language and stemming 
from a culture quite alien to that in which is sup-
posed to retain complete validity. It may be the 
oral statements and interpretations of someone 
who has hardly every exposed their intelligence 
to sources beyond a narrow compass of reli-
gious texts and discussions. In any case, it is 
authority that matters, rather than evidence or 
the quality of argument that supports it. What 
makes this worse is that dissenting or questio-
ning voices may be directly suppressed by the 
systems erected by the religion and the commu-
nity of believers. This seems to happen all the 
time within religious communities, but someti-
mes the dispute takes the form of a clash bet-
ween supporters of a religion and outside critics. 
In such cases the religious groups frequently 
seek to suppress comment, criticism and satire, 
rather than to engage in debate on the merits of 
the case. What is more, they tend to expand the 
protection they claim for their specifically reli-
gious beliefs to a whole range of matters con-
cerned with their religious organisations and the 
role of these organisations in society. 
A significant instance of this flared up in Sep-
tember 2005 when a Danish newspaper Jyllands 
Posten published a group of cartoons containing 
satirical depictions of the Prophet Mahommed. 
(Sturges, 2006). 
As Islamic communities throughout the world gra-
dually became aware of the publication of the car-
toons there were many passionate expressions of 
distress and anger, largely on two grounds: first 
that Muslim belief does not accept pictorial repre-
sentations of the Prophet and second that the car-
toons associated the Prophet and Muslims genera-
lly with terrorism. Public demonstrations, some of 
them violent and resulting in loss of life, and pro-
tests directed mainly at the newspaper and the Da-
nish government followed, whilst the cartoons were 
reprinted by a number of newspapers in other 
countries in solidarity with the original publishers. 
The essence of the confrontation can be seen as 
based on opposed views of freedom of expression. 
One, put forward by Jyllands Posten and its sup-
porters, is that what occurred was simply an exer-
cise of a right of freedom of expression that is cen-
tral to the effective working of democratic society. 
The other, as expressed by the Muslim opponents 
of the publication of the cartoons, is that there are 
limits to freedom of expression, and that one of 
these is the denigration of religion. 
In case it should seem that this is only about 
secular views of Islam, it should be pointed out 
that there has been an increase of cases in 
which members of religious groups have protes-
ted vehemently against representations of their 
religion. Two examples from Britain illustrate the 
point that this is certainly not confined to the 
Muslim community. There was a comparatively 
enormous volume of Christian protests at the TV 
transmission of Jerry Springer: The Opera, in 
which there was a comic and disrespectful por-
trayal of Christ. The protests included death 
threats to the executives who approved the 
transmission. Street protests by members of the 
Sikh community in Birmingham at the perfor-
mance of the play Behzti (which had scenes 
portraying criminal behaviour taking place in a 
gurdwara) reached such levels that further per-
formances were cancelled because of the risk of 
harm to people and property. 
Public meetings, street protests, petitions and 
formal complaints may be a common method 
used by believers to express protest against 
comment on religion, but some religious organi-
sations use other methods to counter or sup-
press comment. For instance, the Church of 
Scientology has been accused by a French state 
prosecutor of operating a ‘universe of secret 
rules’ to protect its relations with members. The-
re is clearly a need that transparency should be 
applied to the organisation’s practices when 
Scientology is accused of pressuring vulnerable 
members into spending very large sums of mo-
ney on books, courses and treatments. How-
ever, one of its responses has been legal action 
against books that criticise Scientology. This is a 
not-untypical response of beleaguered religious 
groups which have explored copyright, confiden-
tiality, defamation and blasphemy laws for  
means to suppress criticisms and disclosures 
about their workings. 
The most prominent example by far is the Ro-
man Catholic Church. Accusations of persistent 
paedophilia on the part of priests in many parts 
of the world (nearly 12,000 such accusations in 
the USA alone) were resisted with determination 
by the hierarchy until court judgements began to 
affirm that the accusations were true. What is 
more, it is clear that the Church moved reliably 
accused priests from the area where they had 
offended to new parishes where their offences 
were sometimes repeated. A pattern of avoidan-
ce of the issue arguably amounting to criminal 
complicity seems to have been the normal res-
ponse. Documentation showing that accusers 
were privately compensated and sworn to silen-
ce exists. Apologies, or at least partial apolo-
gies, have followed, but none of this regret was 
expressed when the Church was still felt itself in 
a position to suppress the accusations. This is 
so extensively documented in the press that a 
large bibliography would be needed to do it jus-
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tice, but a newspaper article on the Pulitzer Pri-
ze winning investigation by the Boston Globe 
give a flavour of the whole story (Henley, 2010). 
Now it is clear that the trail of responsibility passes 
upwards through the hierarchy as far as the head of 
the organisation, the current Pope, whose signature 
can be seen on documents revealing that he was 
party to a conscious cover-up in some cases. The 
Church has taken elaborate measure to conceal this 
concealment, including trying to prevent the transmis-
sion of a BBC TV programme ‘Sex Crimes and the 
Vatican’ on RAI TV. In an unsuccessful attempt to 
extend this process to secular Britain, complainers 
tried to censure the comedian Jimmy Carr, who refe-
rred in a Channel 4 broadcast to the Pope as ‘King of 
the Paedophiles’. Church spokesmen dismiss this as 
‘idle gossip’, but the sexual violation of thousands of 
children, systemic public lying, and a more general 
contempt for the truth is more like cause for urgent 
public concern than idle gossip. 
To some extent this is much the response that 
might be expected from an organisation of any 
type that finds its credibility undermined by some 
scandal. The difference is that the Church 
claims a special position in relation to all aspects 
of human life, in particular to the truth. If the 
Church has a unique and unquestionable hold 
on the truth and its truth includes the need for 
celibacy on the part of its priests, it is faced with 
a real dilemma when the behaviour of those 
priests reveals to what lengths celibacy can 
drive its practitioners. As the English novelist 
Philip Pullman puts it (Pullman, 2010): 
When you get that sort of authority, in any setup, 
the potential for corruption is wide open. And when 
it comes to looking after children or people who are 
incapable or helpless, well, human beings are 
tempted. And of course part of the reason it hap-
pens is priestly celibacy. They’ll deny it and say it’s 
nothing to do with that, but of course it is. 
The assumption of authority, a claim to owner-
ship of the truth, the rule of priestly celibacy and 
the practice of paedophilia are locked together in 
a sorry chain of causation. This is bad, but it is 
what it reveals about the Church and the truth 
that is particularly interesting. The Church focu-
ses on its rituals and ceremonies, its saint-
making and other bizarre revelations, its biblical 
and moral teaching, its ‘saving of souls’ and it 
seems to have come to regard these as more 
important than everyday human decency and 
honesty. Another way to put this is that the 
Church rates its mysteries higher than transpa-
rency and everyone else suffers the effects. The 
consequence is that it has had to be dragged 
into openness and, indeed, self knowledge, by 
outsiders not afflicted with the centuries of emo-
tional and intellectual baggage that constitute 
Catholicism. 
4.  The opposition between religion and 
science 
Why should this matter? Aren’t the spiritual and 
the worldly realms distinct and don’t they consti-
tute the separate concerns and responsibilities 
of science and religion? This is certainly what 
many people, notably those of a religious dispo-
sition, claim. The problem comes because there 
are enormous areas over which both religion 
and science claim dominion. Thus religion might 
well claim dominion over all human knowledge, 
though sometimes being prepared to cede to 
science the area of observation, measurement 
and experimentation, whilst claiming to retain 
rights over the areas of interpretation and theory 
derived from these investigations. Most usually 
science would seek to subject all the phenome-
na of nature to its own interpretation, only per-
haps ceding the matter of first causes and 
human spirituality to religion. This wide-reaching 
opposition of claims forces the individual to 
choose a position somewhere on the spectrum 
between the two approaches and it can be sug-
gested it also has implications for the practice of 
the information and communication industries 
and services. 
Since the eighteenth century age of enlighten-
ment, religion has arguably been mainly on the 
defensive as the scope, capacity and confidence 
of science has grown. This makes the survival of 
the concept of blasphemy in various traditional 
and more modern guises that much more impor-
tant. Essentially blasphemy is the expression of 
disbelief or disrespect for a religion. The purpo-
se of blasphemy laws seems to the outsider as 
essentially a tool by which different cults and 
religions could assert themselves against others 
by making dissent from their own orthodoxy a 
punishable offence. Throughout history people 
have been shunned and tortured (mentally and 
physically), and also stoned, burned, crucified or 
otherwise put to death in considerable numbers 
for their opposition to the whole, or even some 
inconsequential looking aspect of a religion. 
Science may at times have subjected the scien-
tifically uninformed and religious believers to 
ridicule, but the author is not aware of any ill-
treatment of non-scientists that remotely compa-
res with the cruelty of religions. Science may be 
intolerant, but it does not express that intoleran-
ce in savagery towards non-believers. This as-
sumption by the devotees of religion of a right to 
protect the faith by force matters, in the first 
place, because blasphemy is still a strong legal 
presence in countries like Saudi Arabia or Iran, 
enforced by religious police or revolutionary 
guards. Secondly, though less worryingly, it may 
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be an offence that still lurks on the statute books 
of the enlightened democracies, though it is 
virtually never invoked. In March 2008 the British 
House of Lords (the upper house of parliament) 
voted by a large majority to abolish the offence, 
which only applied to the Anglican Church, but 
debating time seems unlikely to be found in the 
House of Commons so as to confirm the aboli-
tion. In a reasonable world blasphemy or its 
surrogates would not be an offence in any juris-
diction. Everything would be subject to debate 
(whether rational or impassioned) and either 
resolved, or left unresolved for further discussion 
on another day. Put differently, in this ideal si-
tuation, the human right of freedom of expres-
sion would be universally respected. 
This makes the promotion of the concept of 
defamation of religion (or religions in the plural) 
an extremely worrying development. For many 
years this has lurked in the structures of the 
United Nations, frequently supported by non-
binding resolutions, but never being formally 
adopted. The idea seems to have been introdu-
ced by the Organisation of the Islamic Confe-
rence and mainly supported by Muslim states, 
ostensibly as a means to combat the victimisa-
tion of Muslims, and others, on grounds of their 
religion. The problem is that this has either acci-
dentally, or more likely deliberately, been rolled 
up with the idea of protecting religion itself. Pro-
tection of the religious individual or community is 
one thing, but protection of the articles of their 
faith is another. This, however, is what the de-
famation of religions movement seeks to do: 
restricting freedom of expression to ensure res-
pect for religions and convictions. So far votes in 
favour of resolutions on this have not affected 
the core commitment of the United Nations to 
freedom of expression, but the threat remains. 
The idea itself is certainly not confined to Mus-
lims. For instance at the same time as The Bri-
tish House of Lords was voting to abolish blasp-
hemy laws, the Catholic Bishop of Lancaster told 
the House of Commons Children, Schools and 
Families Committee that books critical of the 
Catholic faith should be banned from school 
libraries. Here we have the dilemma of protec-
ting religion in stark relation to the library profes-
sion. Works criticising particular scientific theo-
ries are effectively welcomed by libraries in that 
every scientific theory is established on the refu-
tation of previous theory. Works that explain 
religions in sympathetic and favourable terms 
are normal in libraries, but in both the interest of 
freedom of expression and of scientific progress 
works critical of religion and specific religions 
need to be present too. The great ethical mis-
sion of the library is to open up knowledge and 
the opportunity to explore ideas to all. The con-
clusion drawn here is that at the core of formal 
religion there is a resistance to key aspects of 
this mission. 
5.  Conclusions 
Is what has been set out above a rejection of 
religion and an encouragement to exclude reli-
gious materials from libraries? In response it 
must be admitted that the author’s approach is 
not in the least bit sympathetic to religion’s 
claims and practices. However, in the interests 
of freedom of expression, it is necessary to de-
fend the freedom of expression of religious peo-
ple along with that of their non-religious fellow 
human beings. What is not acceptable is the 
attempt to preserve the supremacy of mystery 
over transparency that informs most of formal 
religious discourse. The consequences of a 
secretive, possessive religious leadership are 
plain to be seen in the twenty-first century tur-
moil in the Catholic Church. The argument put 
forward here is that this is inescapably linked to 
the preference for authority in ideas, which is a 
defining characteristic of the religious mindset. 
Because libraries have a major role in exposing 
the results of transparency and introducing 
transparency where it does not exist, the libra-
rian will inevitably have to enter the struggle 
alongside writers, broadcasters, artists, publis-
hers and media managers for open access to 
ideas on all topics, including religion. The library 
needs balanced collections and unrestricted 
access facilities so that users can use freedom 
of access to information to develop their free 
opinions and enjoy the benefits of free expres-
sion. The need for balanced collections and 
access is inherent in the scientific approach, but 
challenged in religion (which tends to say that 
that criticism is blasphemy or some other offen-
ce against religion’s control of information). 
Treating religion as equal to science (in collec-
tions and services) is possible: treating it as 
special is extremely dangerous. Librarianship 
should recognise that it is fundamentally a scien-
tific enterprise, even though this means acqui-
ring, preserving and making available the herita-
ge of religious thought. If we look at the welfare 
of the individual human being and society as a 
whole, librarians face two alternatives: do they 
trust people to explore and examine information, 
both scientific and religious, so as to form their 
own opinions, or do they join the ranks of those 
who prefer to control and conceal. The author 
suggests that, for the reasons set out here, libra-
rianship must always reject mystery and offer 
transparency. 
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